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Mimesis and World-building: Berger and Girard on the Sacred 
 
1. Religion as a Social Construction 
If one is willing to regard Girard’s theory as related to the sociology of religion, it 
must surely be related initially to Peter Berger’s concept of religion as a social 
construction, created by humans.1 In fact, Girard and Berger do not only have, loosely 
speaking, the same starting point (understanding religion initially as human needs); 
they also have several central themes in common regarding religion, despite the fact 
that they speak from different academic traditions.2  
 
Peter Berger begins his argument in The Sacred Canopy by revisiting a model he 
developed previously in The Social Construction of Reality. Man is a world- builder 
and a social being.3 Religion is the human enterprise by which a sacred cosmos is 
established.4 It is, therefore, in our nature to construct social worlds.5 Berger argues 
that the self “externalizes” as a matter of its very nature.6  The sum of its 
“externalizations” produces society, which becomes an objective reality that in turn 
acts on the individual.7 This externalization in Girard’s work begins with the act of 
scapegoating which, in due time, because humans cannot stand the violence they have 
committed, creates religious institutions. 
 
2. Religion Protects against Meaninglessness 
Both Berger and Girard see religion as protection from meaninglessness - despite 
Berger’s emphasis on religious alienation. Both thinkers deny biological 
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determination. According to Berger, humans have no specific biological milieu.8 The 
human situation is open and cannot be stable as regards desire.9 Humans are the most 
unfinished species, and its project of world-building is never ending. Human world-
building is a consequence of its biological constitution.10 World-building is a 
consequence of insufficient instincts. Therefore, world-building becomes acute and 
absolutely necessary in order to survive.  
 
3. Mimesis and Religion 
There are, however, few instances in Berger’s work where mimesis or imitation is 
introduced into the act of mediating anthropology and religious beliefs, which is, in my 
view, the main difference between Berger's and Girard's religious understanding. 
Berger does, however, claim that identity is created by the individual, who becomes 
what he is addressed as by others.11 And by repeating acts of everyday life man 
compensates for his lack of biological determination.12 Also Berger claims that 
successful world-building, where the norms of society become internalized, is totally 
dependent upon socialization.13 Despite there being an “interdividual” tone in Berger’s 
research on the human condition, he does not focus on imitation as a fundamental 
desire. In fact, the notion of desire is hardly present in his theory. He does, however, 
see religious imitation in the traditional context of representation, in that everything 
here below has an analogy up above.14 And in The Social Construction of Reality the 
authors emphasize the intersubjective dimension of everyday life.15 But this kind of 
imitation is less a drive than a response to social norms. In Berger’s analysis of divine 
imitation there is no generative drive. The image of divine role models, for example 
the role of a father imitating the divine father,16 does not contain mimesis as desire but 
as representation. It does have a real function, however, as it protects against 
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meaningless. Perhaps one could call both world-building and the strategies of 
establishing meaning conscious desires, that represent the accepted desires of a 
community, where sons imitate their fathers' norms. This means, however, seeing 
Berger’s theory very much from a mimetic point of view. 
 
4. The Sacred Emerges Out of Chaos 
In Berger’s work there is a great deal of focus on the sacred as protection against 
chaos. An essential element is the theme that the sacred enables humans to experience 
meaning and protects them from the unavoidable threat of death.17 Religion for Berger 
is on the whole the establishment, through human activity, of an encompassing holy 
order or holy cosmos which is capable of maintaining order despite the continual threat 
of chaos.18 Berger sees death as something that every society is compelled to deal with, 
and from the problem of death, religion is engendered. This seems quite similar to the 
theory of culture arising from scapegoating. However Berger’s emphasis on death and 
all the marginal situations associated with death (war, natural catastrophes, abrupt 
social changes)19 differs initially from Girard in that, for Berger, mimetic desire is not 
decisive in the process of constituting a ‘sacred canopy’.20 It is the fear of death, not 
the violent nature of human beings towards other human beings, which ignites the 
sacred. On the other hand, on the issue of the sacred, their theories do seem to 
converge. According to Berger, the sacred deviates from the normal routine of life, and 
is seen as something extraordinary and potentially dangerous. The sacred is something 
which emerges out of chaos.21 And by losing contact with the sacred, humans stand in 
danger of being swallowed up by chaos.22 This is exactly the setting in which Girard 
sees the initial stages of sacrifice; when a society is smitten by chaos, there is a frenzy 
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of violence, differences are abolished and society is haunted by a lack of structure and 
meaning.  
 
It is in such circumstances that scapegoating shows its efficiency, because it restores 
order and brings the community back from chaos to peace. (And later turns the victim 
into a divinity). Thus both Girard and Berger see the sacred as something which is 
established when threatened by death.  
 
5. Berger Avoids Viewing the Sacred as something Violent 
Being threatened by death (Berger) or being threatened by violence (Girard) must, in 
some ways, be seen as related. In The Sacred Canopy, however, Berger neither 
connects death nor the sacred to violence. Violence does not have any privileged or 
essential place in his reflection on the sacred. He sees death more from a traditional 
metaphysical point of view, where consciousness of one’s own and other people’s 
deaths make men question ‘normal life’.23 Clearly Berger speaks exclusively from a 
contemporary context here, from a Western worldview, where religious sacrifice is not 
primarily violent, and religious practice is more centred on individual needs. It is this 
discrepancy in time between Girard’s focus on primitive religion and Berger’s focus 
on the contemporary which partly makes their theories on the sacred somewhat 
incongruous – even if Berger operates relatively freely between past and present.  
 
6. Using Mimetic Theory to Understand Contemporary Christianity 
In Violence and the Sacred, Girard starts with an analysis of violence as such. 
Methodically, the analysis is based on the premise that primitive religion sheds light on 
violence. But his later works show that Girard has a twofold understanding of religion: 
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one anthropological and another based on Christian theology. I do not think it is 
stretching the matter too far to say that Girard interprets primitive religion from a 
Christian standpoint. Especially in his most non-sacrificial phase sacrifice is clearly 
seen as anti-Christian.24 Since Things Hidden, false and true religion have been 
regarded from the perspective of how one interprets the victim. The victimage 
mechanism is the stumbling block as regards truth in religion, as it can evoke either a 
violent or a forgiving response. And what reveals true religion is a non-violent 
interpretation of the Passion. 
 
If one were to limit Girardian theory to a contemporary westernized, Christian 
worldview, the modifying aspects surrounding sacrifice would play down violence to 
such a degree that religion, despite its mimetic nature, would look similar to a non-
sacrificial sacred canopy à la Berger’s description of religious life. This, however, 
opens up for viewing mimetic theory partly as a theory on modern desacrilized religion 
as it is manifested within the twentieth century theological tradition, the same tradition 
by which Berger, despite operating within the scientific methods of sociology, is 
clearly influenced.25 Girard’s normative and apologetic approach to Christianity, 
however, is something which make Girard’s and Berger’s work differ considerably.   
 
If one used mimetic theory in order to investigate contemporary Christianity, one 
would also see the relevance of mimesis in order to interpret the more mundane grey 
zones in society as being moderately sacrificial and violent - thereby stemming from 
ancient sacrificial rites. On the other hand, one should have in mind the incredible 
degree of communication in our everyday life which is non-violent. I am therefore 
quite sceptical towards the tendency of some Girardians who use mimetic theory in 
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order to brand everything man and especially mundane man does as violent, 
destructive and evil. From a Girardian context one must take into account the Paraclete 
who makes it possible, to a certain extent, to live according to a good mimesis, the 
mimesis of Jesus.  
 
7. Mimesis is Prior to Violence 
If one should try to further Girard’s mimetic theory as a theory on how contemporary, 
Christian religion works, mimesis must be given priority to violence. Girard has 
combined mimesis and scapegoating in such a way that the one automatically follows 
the other, and they create a catapult effect. This makes the theory strong, generative, 
and relevant wherever there is violence or serious conflict around. But by fusing 
mimesis and scapegoating too tightly together, one also risks leaving out much of 
everyday mimesis. Violence and the Sacred is often the starting point among 
theologians and religious scholars for understanding Girardian theory.  It is therefore 
understandable that there has been a tendency to give scapegoating and violence 
priority and that many scholars, after giving a general description of mimesis, tend to 
neglect the mimetic principle that lies behind scapegoating and violence. One of the 
reasons for this is that Girard in Violence and the Sacred devotes his first five chapters 
to sacrifice before mimesis is introduced in chapter six under the heading: ‘From 
Mimesis to the monstrous Double.’ Thus in Violence and the Sacred, Girard, by giving 
the scapegoat mechanism primacy, runs the risk of overexposing violence. In this work 
he claims that ‘mimetic desire is simply a term more comprehensive than violence for 
religious pollution.’26 In chapter five, when interpreting Euripides’ Bacchae Girard 
dismisses psychological motivation in order to understand rites.27 But deleting 
psychological motivation, both in its conscious and unconscious form, also means not 
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drawing the full consequences of mimesis, the force which motivates sacrifice. This, in 
my view, marks a deviation from the primacy of the mimetic principle in Deceit, 
Desire and the Novel, where desire towards the other is clearly motivated by a 
mimetic-psychological force.  
 
This tendency to see scapegoating as existing prior to mimesis and the only outcome of 
it is however, refuted by Girard in an interview in 1978, where he claims that 
unanimous victimage is only one mimetic phenomenon among others.28 Giving 
mimesis first priority is also emphasized in Evolution and Conversion: Dialogues on 
the Origins of Culture.29  
 
By focusing on what generates violence and scapegoating, mimesis may be revealed as 
the originary principle. In my view both violence and other kinds of conflict stem from 
mimesis. It is the imitation of the other’s desire that creates violence, not violence that 
creates imitation. Therefore, in order to understand religion, one should see mimesis as 
the force which leads men into the act of scapegoating. The act of placing 
scapegoating or victimizing prior to mimesis seems to have created a certain 
precedence, making mimesis look as though it were born out of sacrifice. This 
tendency to begin with sacrifice has somewhat distorted the flexibility and multi-
layered potentiality of mimetic theory, making society look as though it were governed 
by violence and not by other more moderate mimetic possibilities. If mimesis is seen 
as emerging only in the aftermath of sacrifice, this would mean that human nature is 
not basically mimetic. If one places mimesis after sacrifice, mimesis cannot explain 




Thus, mimesis must be seen to be the primary force if we are to make sense of a 
development from more violent cultures to less violent ones, and thereby using 
mimetic theory in a more sociological way. Man’s externalisation projects stemming 
from the fear of death can also be seen as mimetically motivated. Without mimesis 
there can be no culture and no religion. And cultural transferences, among them the act 
of turning exclusive religious beliefs into religious ‘melting pots’, would be quite 
unintelligible if we did not take into consideration the influences and contagion 
brought about by mimesis. Although H. Kühn could be right in claiming that sacrifice 
is the oldest form of religious action,30 the phenomenon or action, all the same, is 
generated by mimesis.  
 
 
Per Bjørnar Grande 
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